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ABSTRACT
This article conducts a comparative analysis of intermediary liability laws regarding
harmful speech in nine liberal-democratic polities. Harmful speech here is defined
in terms of the ability of user-generated content (“UGC”) to lead to individual physical harm (e.g., threats, incitement to violence), individual relational harm (e.g., defamation), or individual reactive harm (e.g., hate speech), as well as its potential to
lead to social harm (e.g., fake news). The purpose of this comparative analysis is to
distill a set of common principles upon which the concept of “platform ethics”—
ethical duties that digital intermediaries owe to their users and to society—can be
based. Conceptualizing platform ethics is incredibly important today as major social
networks remain indispensable tools for democracy despite waning public trust
stemming from recent major scandals.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2016, Americans realized that social media can be weaponized to spread
disinformation among highly targeted groups of users and sow chaos and confusion
of varying types and degrees.1 The locus of the fracas is on social media platforms,
defined by media scholar Tarleton Gillespie as “sites and services that host public
expression, store it on and serve it up from the cloud, organize access to it through
search and recommendation, or install it onto mobile devices.”2 Trolls and provocateurs continue to plague these platforms with speech that ranges from merely vile
to outright abuse and harassment.3 Nevertheless, social media platforms remain a
powerful tool for individuals to participate in a global public discourse and create
change within their communities.4 So, does that mean that society must take the bad
with the good when it comes to social media? Or do social media platforms owe us
a bit more?
In a 2017 article, I posed the question of whether social media platforms have
a moral duty to prevent harm caused by the speech of others, promote freedom of
expression, or some ideal combination of the two.5 Although I framed the first possible moral duty in that article in terms of harms directed against specific individuals, it is possible for this question to be applied more broadly to other types of harmful content common in our world today: fake news, hate speech directed at a group
of people, or speech glorifying terrorism. The issue of whether intermediaries might
have a moral duty to promote freedom of expression is a tougher issue. Social networking platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube (among others) sell
users on the promise of freedom of expression and the allure of fame that might
come from a user’s content becoming widely popular (i.e., “going viral”), with the
express purpose of commodifying and profiting off of users’ content.6 Accordingly,
I have argued that these digital intermediaries have developed an “aggregational
theory of freedom of expression”; primacy is placed on the capacity, magnitude, or

1. See Eric Westervelt, How Russia Weaponized Social Media with ‘Social Bots’, NPR (Nov. 5,
2017, 8:06 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/11/05/562058208/how-russia-weaponized-social-mediawith-social-bots.
2. Tarleton Gillespie, Governance of and by Platforms, in SAGE H ANDBOOK OF S OCIAL MEDIA
254 (Jean Burgess, Thomas Poell & Alice E. Marwick eds., 2017).
3. See Lee Rainie, Janna Anderson & Jonathan Albright, The Future of Free Speech, Trolls, Anonymity and Fake News Online, P EW R ES . C TR (Mar. 29, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/03/29/the-future-of-free-speech-trolls-anonymity-and-fake-news-online/.
4. See, e.g., Taso G. Lagos, Ted M. Coopman & Jonathan Tomhave, “Parallel Poleis”: Towards a
Theoretical Framework of the Modern Public Sphere, Civic Engagement and the Structural Advantages
of the Internet to Foster and Maintain Parallel Socio-Political Institutions, 16 N EW MEDIA & S OC ’Y
398 (2014); Andrew J. Flanagin, Craig Flanagin & Jon Flanagin, Technical Code and the Social Construction of the Internet, 12 NEW M EDIA & S OC’ Y 179 (2010).
5. Brett G. Johnson, Speech, Harm, and the Duties of Digital Intermediaries: Conceptualizing Platform Ethics, 32 J. MEDIA ETHICS 16 (2017) [hereinafter Speech, Harm and the Duties of Digital Intermediaries].
6. See, e.g., Louis Leung, User-Generated Content on the Internet: An Examination of Gratifications, Civic Engagement and Psychological Empowerment, 11 NEW MEDIA & S OC’ Y 1327 (2009); Ute
Schaedel & Michel Clement, Managing the Online Crowd: Motivations for Engagement in User-Generated Content, 7 J. M EDIA B US. S TUD . 17 (2010). Cf. Scott Wright, Politics as Usual? Revolution,
Normalization and a New Agenda for Online Deliberation, 14 NEW MEDIA & S OC’ Y 244 (2012).
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potential of users to speak on platforms, and the quality or importance of that speech
is overlooked.7
The fact that social media platforms are global operations complicates the ethical debate surrounding the promotion of free expression. In the United States’, social networks have a First Amendment right to manage users’ content as they please,
and users are unable to make any constitutional claims against social networks for
removing—some might say “censoring”—their speech.8 However, this does not
mean that these intermediaries should shrug off any moral duty toward promoting
and practicing the values of freedom of expression among its users. Certainly,
scholars have argued that the promotion of freedom of expression is not inherently
a moral duty, trending instead toward hedonism.9 However, by promoting and practicing the values of freedom of expression, digital intermediaries could act as a
model for society to tolerate and critically engage with extreme and challenging
ideas.10 Furthermore, since these intermediaries are borne out of the exceptional
American ethos for freedom of expression, one could argue they have a moral obligation to promote an American vision of freedom of expression in their global
operations, particularly in countries that repress this basic human right.11 However,
one could just as easily argue that the privilege to operate globally requires social
media companies to honor the social and cultural (to say nothing of legal) norms of
the countries in which they do business.12 Therefore, understanding how the harms
of speech are defined, categorized, weighted, and punished in various parts of the
world is crucial for social media platforms to operate ethically across the globe.
This article is as much about ethics as it is about law—as much about selfregulation as it is about government-imposed regulation. Indeed, it is about the connection between these poles; laws often can reflect the moral norms of the people
that pass them.13 I propose the best way to distill any moral principles that can be
applied to how social media platforms should govern harmful content is to examine
the laws that mandate how social media platforms govern harmful content. I argue

7. Brett G. Johnson, Facebook’s Free Speech Balancing Act: Corporate Social Responsibility and
Norms of Online Discourse, 5 J. M EDIA L. & E THICS 17 (2016) [hereinafter Facebook’s Free Speech
Balancing Act].
8. See, e.g., Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. AOL, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 456 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding
that AOL’s email service was not the “functional equivalent” to a public forum. In other words, AOL
was not acting as an agent supplying a forum for communication that state actors would normally make
available. The court also held that AOL, unlike cable systems, did not control the “critical pathway” of
communication, and thus an individual did not have a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that AOL was
operating as a state actor in censoring his speech).
9. See Don E. Tomlinson, Where Morality and Law Diverge: Ethical Alternatives in the Soldier of
Fortune Cases, 6 J. M ASS MEDIA ETHICS 69 (1991).
10. See Brett G. Johnson, Networked Communication and the Reprise of Tolerance Theory: Civic
Education for Extreme Speech and Private Governance Online, 50 F IRST AM. S TUDIES 14 (2016).
11. Ethan Zuckerman, Intermediary Censorship, in ACCESS C ONTROLLED: T HE S HAPING OF
P OWER, R IGHTS, AND R ULE IN C YBERSPACE 71, 82–83 (Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2010).
12. See, e.g., Patrick L. Plaisance, The Mass Media as Discursive Network: Building on the Implications of Libertarian and Communitarian Claims for News Media Ethics Theory, 15 COMM. THEORY 292
(2005) (arguing that libertarianism has little, if any, moral justification as an ethical framework); Michael
Perkins, International Law and the Search for Universal Principles in Journalism Ethics, 17 J. MASS
MEDIA ETHICS 193, 205 (2002) (arguing that “the Western orientation of human rights treaties and the
concept of free expression they contain can become problematic.”).
13. Steven Shavell, Law Versus Morality as Regulators of Conduct, 4 AM. L. & E CON . R EV . 227,
247 (2002).
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that such an approach can reveal how various polities conceive of the ideal relationship between platforms and their users. Therefore, this article conducts a comparative analysis of intermediary liability laws from multiple countries.14 In particular,
this study looks at liability in the context of user-generated content (“UGC”) that
has the potential to cause harm to individuals, groups, or society at large.15
Part II defines in greater detail what is meant by harms to individuals, groups,
or society at large caused by UGC.16 However, because these harms are purposefully broad, some exclusions must be made lest the focus of this analysis become
muddied from the outset.
First, laws dealing with vicarious intermediary liability in copyright infringement are excluded. Although copyright infringement is considered a moral harm
against rights-holders in some countries,17 it is primarily recognized as a commercial harm.18 Thus, intermediary liability vis-à-vis copyright infringement is not an
area of law from which moral duties to prevent harms to individuals, groups, and
society at large can be distilled through comparative analysis.
Second, the distribution of images of child abuse (what is colloquially referred
to as “child pornography”) is excluded from the analysis. This type of content consists of contraband that is categorically classified as criminal across the globe, and
a common feature of intermediary liability laws is that intermediaries are legally
obligated to stanch the distribution of this material if they become aware of it.19
Thus, this area of law leaves virtually no ability to compare and contrast nuanced
legal, and therefore ethical, principles.
Third, laws regulating the management of personal data are excluded. This area
of law is incredibly vast and rapidly evolving, and numerous scholarly articles have
focused on comparative studies of data protection laws, especially those pertaining
to the notion of a “right to be forgotten.”20 Including this area of law within this
comparative analysis would add little to our understanding of the role of digital
intermediaries in data protection. Furthermore, a conceptual difference exists between these two harms: the type of harm resulting from mismanagement of personal
14. A supranational polity (the European Union) is included among the countries examined.
15. User-generated content (“UGC”) is defined herein as any message or media product created informally by individuals or groups vis-à-vis an online platform that facilitates such creation. See, e.g.,
Ramon Lobato, Julian Thomas & Dan Hunter, Histories of User-Generated Content: Between Formal
and Informal Media Economies, 5 I NT ’L J. C OMM . 899, 900 (2011).
16. See infra notes 28–88 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Work art. 6bis (1), Sept. 28,
1979, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=283693 (“Independently of the author’s
economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.”).
18. R ODNEY A. S MOLLA , F REE S PEECH IN AN OPEN S OCIETY 49 (1992).
19. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (2018) (providing that digital intermediaries will not have immunity from liability for third-party content that violates federal laws prohibiting the distribution of images
of sexual exploitation of children).
20. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 2014 E.C.R. I317, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&doclang=EN
(interpreting Directive 95/46/EC to hold that the “‘right to be forgotten’ . . . override[s] the legitimate
interests of the operator of the search engine and the general interest in freedom of information.”). For
more context on this issue, see, e.g., Jane E. Kirtley, “Misguided in Principle and Unworkable in Practice”: Time to Discard the Reporters Committee Doctrine of Practical Obscurity (and Its Evil Twin, the
Right to Be Forgotten), 20 C OMM . L. & P OL ’ Y 91 (2015); Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64
S TAN . L. R EV . ONLINE 88 (2012); Michael J. Kelly & David Satola, The Right to Be Forgotten, 2017
U. ILL . L. R EV . 1 (2017).
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data derives from the more technical “internal” functions of intermediaries, which
is distinct from the harms resulting from “externally” viewed third party content.21
The article proceeds as follows. First, Part II provides a brief discussion on the
nature of harmful speech. In particular, this discussion relies on Professor Rodney
Smolla’s three-part model of harmful speech, which identifies “physical harm, relational harm, and reactive harm.”22 This discussion is important because it establishes an even playing field for analyzing how harm is conceptualized in various
parts of the world while also making important distinctions between foreign conceptions of harm and harm as conceived by First Amendment jurisprudence.
Next, Part III conducts a comparative analysis. The analysis draws upon statutes, directives, case law, and secondary scholarship to identify broad-level principles upon which countries’ laws of intermediary liability are constructed. The polities whose laws are analyzed are the United States, the European Union, the United
Kingdom, Australia, Brazil, India, Japan, South Korea, and South Africa. Countries
were selected due to their geographic diversity and position as powerful liberaldemocratic polities, and because their populations account for nearly 1.4 billion Internet users as of 2016.23 Although more than 800 million Internet users live in major global powers such as China and Russia,24 these countries are excluded due to
their autocratic systems of government, reflected (particularly in China) in strict and
sophisticated state censorship of much of the social Internet.25
21. See Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 G EO . L. J. 357 (2003) (distinguishing two conceptions of the Internet: an internal one involving the technical details that happen
behind the scenes, and an external one that users experience in the physical world).
22. S MOLLA , supra note 18, at 48. See infra notes 28–88.
23. Statistics for population estimates for individual countries (for 2017) come from CIA World
Factbook country profiles. The World Factbook, CIA (2017), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/; Statistics for percentage of Internet users in individual countries come from:
Individuals Using the Internet: (% of population, WORLD BANK (2016), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS?name_desc=false; Statistics for population estimate for the European Union
(for 2017) come from official EU statistics. Living in the EU, EUROPEAN U NION (2017), https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/figures/living_en#tab-1-3; Statistics for percentage of Internet users in
the European Union come from official EU statistics. Internet access and use statistics - households and
individuals, EUROSTAT (2016), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Archive:Internet_access_and_use_statistics_-_households_and_individuals.
Country
Population
Internet %
Internet Users
Australia
23,232,413
88%
20,444,523.44
Brazil
207,353,391
60
124,412,034.6
EU (minus UK)
442,802,756
82
363,098,259.9
India
1,281,935,911
30
384,580,773.3
Japan
126,451,398
92
116,335,286.2
South Africa
54,841,552
54
29,614,438.08
South Korea
51,181,299
93
47,598,608.07
65,648,100
95
62,365,695
UK
USA
326,625,791
76
248,235,601.2
Total
2,580,072,611
74%
1,396,685,220
Estimates of country population and number of Internet users according to 2016-2017 data.
(Table compiled by Brett G. Johnson).
24. Statistics for populations estimates for Russia and China come from the CIA World Factbook.
CIA, supra note 23. Statistics for percentage of Internet users in Russia and China come from WORLD
BANK, supra note 23.
25. See Jonathan Zittrain & John Palfrey, Internet Filtering: The Politics and Mechanisms of Control,
in ACCESS C ONTROLLED : THE S HAPING OF P OWER , R IGHTS, AND R ULE IN C YBERSPACE 29, 33
(Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2010) (Noting that “China . . . bundles Internet content restrictions with its
copyright laws. This set of regulations sets a daunting web of requirements in front of anyone who might
access the Internet or provide a service to another Internet user. These rules create a pretext that can be
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Finally, Part IV synthesizes the comparative analysis to further identify broad
ethical norms by which social media companies should operate. The purpose of this
analysis is to compare and contrast legal philosophies for regulating social networking companies so that broad ethical principles may be identified and presented as a
way in which these companies might self-regulate. This analysis is important because users, politicians, and jurists are wising to the banes and boons that social
media companies bring to society. Social and political pressure is mounting on public officials to do something to mitigate the harms facilitated by digital intermediaries.26 Meanwhile, digital intermediaries remain an indispensable part of our daily
lives, and there is no indication that trend will change anytime soon.27 It is in the
best interest of intermediaries and the public that the former adopt ethical principles
with which to self-regulate and mitigate harms that could befall both individuals
and democracy.
The goal of this comparative analysis is to arrive at a set of principles upon
which social media platforms should act to balance the competing interests of the
promotion of political speech, to prevent harms to users, and to ensure the stable
financial health of the platforms themselves. A comparative analysis is ideal for
achieving this end because the legal contours separating the advancement of one or
some of these competing interests over others can be examined in relation to similar
and differing contexts. The principles of platform ethics put forth at the end of this
analysis are based on an assessment of these contours and which interests they seek
to privilege most. Furthermore, these ethical principles can temper the more extreme models of intermediary liability laws, both those that impose a heavy burden
on platforms to manage UGC (such as in Brazil and the EU) and the more libertarian
model found in the United States. This article concludes with some thoughts on
what reforms to these laws might look like based on the principles of platform ethics.

II. HARMS RESULTING FROM SPEECH
The criteria this analysis uses to define harm in the context of intermediary
liability laws come from a three-part model of harms that speech can cause, devised
by Professor and First Amendment scholar Rodney Smolla: “physical harm, relational harm, and reactive harm.”28 The purpose of using Smolla’s model is to lay a
foundation for comparative analysis by first discussing how harm is defined within
First Amendment jurisprudence. This method does not necessarily mean First
used to punish those who exchange undesirable content, even though the law may not be invoked in
many instances it might cover.”); Emily Parker, Russia Is Trying to Copy China’s Approach to Internet
Censorship, S LATE (Apr. 4, 2017, 1:25 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2017/04/russia_is_trying_to_copy_china_s_internet_censorship.html.
26. See Bill Allison, Facebook, Google Could Face Tighter Rules on Political Ads, BLOOMBERG (Feb.
15, 2018, 7:44 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-16/facebook-google-couldface-stricter-rules-on-political-ads.
27. Lee Rainie & Janna Anderson, The Fate of Online Trust in the Next Decade, P EW R ES. C TR.
(Aug. 10, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/08/10/the-fate-of-online-trust-in-the-next-decade/
(“Many experts say lack of trust will not be a barrier to increased public reliance on the internet. Those
who are hopeful that trust will grow expect technical and regulatory change will combat users’ concerns
about security and privacy. Those who have doubts about progress say people are inured to risk, addicted
to convenience and will not be offered alternatives to online interaction.”).
28. S MOLLA , supra note 18, at 48.
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Amendment standards should be the benchmark by which the harms of speech
should be judged around the world. Rather, this foundation is useful in its ability to
draw baseline principles by which many different definitions and categories of harm
can be understood worldwide. Furthermore, these principles can be synthesized to
define new types of harm that social media platforms can facilitate, such as the
societal-level harms that can arise from the proliferation of so-called “fake news.”

A. Physical Harm
United States free speech jurisprudence considers physical harm the worst of
the three types of potential harms caused by speech.29 In the exceptional ethos of
free speech in the United States, the capacity of speech to cause physical harm is
one area where somewhat clear exceptions have been devised to demarcate when
speech falls outside of constitutional protection. Such outlawed speech includes
fighting words, incitement to imminent lawless action, and true threats.
The fighting words doctrine comes from the 1942 case Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire.30 In that case, Chaplinsky, a Jehovah’s Witness, was arrested and convicted for violating a state breach of peace statute after calling a city marshal “a
God damned racketeer and a damned Fascist.”31 The Supreme Court upheld Chaplinsky’s conviction, and in so doing crafted the First Amendment exception for
fighting words, which the Court defined as words said in another person’s face that
“by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace.”32
The incitement to imminent lawless action standard in First Amendment doctrine was refined in the 1969 case Brandenburg v. Ohio.33 That case involved a Ku
Klux Klan member, Brandenburg, who was convicted under an Ohio criminal syndicalism law for speaking racist messages to a frenzied crowd.34 The law prohibited
“advocat[ing] . . . the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or
unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political
reform.”35 In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed Brandenburg’s conviction, holding the following:
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a
State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.36

29. David A. Anderson, Incitement and Tort Law, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 957, 959 (2002)
(“[P]hysical harm . . . seems to present a stronger First Amendment claim than many other types of harm
whose ability to trump speech interests is rarely questioned.”).
30. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
31. Id. at 569.
32. Id. at 572–73.
33. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
34. Id. at 444–45.
35. Id. at 445.
36. Id. at 447 (emphasis added).
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The imminent lawless action standard narrowed the definition of unlawful incitement from the “bad tendency”37 and “clear and present danger”38 standards cited
by the Court earlier in the twentieth century.
The present doctrinal state of the true threat exception to the First Amendment
is somewhat muddled. Generally speaking, United States Courts of Appeal have
adopted a “reasonable person” standard for determining whether a threatening statement loses First Amendment protection.39 However, the United States Supreme
Court signaled a possible preference for an alternative test in Virginia v. Black, in
which the Court held a Virginia statute criminalizing cross burning was unconstitutionally overbroad.40 Justice O’Connor wrote in a plurality opinion that to convict
a person of issuing a true threat, a state must consider whether the “speaker means
to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”41 In a 2015 case involving
threatening speech posted to Facebook, the Court sidestepped the doctrinal issue of
whether the speaker’s intent needed to be taken into account for the speech to be
considered a true threat.42
In sum, these three doctrines—fighting words, incitement, and true threats—
separate the worst of speech-related harms from the body of protected speech in the
United States. Physical harm is recognized as the worst possible harm caused by
speech because it is direct, immediate, measurable, and often irreparable.43 As
Smolla puts it, “[c]rimes must have victims . . . and the victimization must be palpable, something beyond generalized disgust or disquiet over another’s conduct.”44
However, the Court also recognizes speech may indeed best serve its high purpose
when it induces a “condition of unrest,” creates dissatisfaction with conditions as
they are, or even “stirs people to anger,”45 and therefore such speech needs “breathing space” through expansive legal protections to exist despite the potential physical
harms it could trigger.46

B. Relational Harm
Relational harm, according to Smolla, involves speech that causes injury to
social relationships (e.g., defamation), business relationships (e.g., fraud or false
advertising), ownership interests (e.g., copyright), and confidentiality (e.g., leaking

37. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
38. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
39. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290
F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2011).
40. 538 U.S. 343, 363 (2003).
41. Id. at 359 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).
42. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2013 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (lamenting that the
Court did not settle the matter of whether the petitioner’s speech amounted to a true threat).
43. See Clay Calvert, Hate Speech and Its Harms: A Communication Theory Perspective, 47 J.
C OMM . 4, 6–9 (1997) (distinguishing the direct, measurable and immediate nature of physical harms of
speech from longer term mental and emotional harms associated with hostile environments created by
speech).
44. S MOLLA , supra note 18, at 10.
45. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
46. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (holding that “First Amendment freedoms need
‘breathing space’ to survive.”).
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national security secrets).47 This section focuses only on jurisprudence regarding
harms caused by defamation due to the close relationship between defamation and
Smolla’s third category of reactive harms,48 and due to the fact that defamation
plays a major role in shaping the contours of intermediary liability laws around the
world.
The United States Supreme Court constitutionalized defamation law in New
York Times v. Sullivan by requiring public-official plaintiffs to prove that libelous
statements about them were made with “actual malice”—the “knowledge that [the
statement] was false or [made] with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.”49 The same philosophy extends to public figures—those “who are not public
officials, but [are] involved in issues in which the public has a justified and important interest,”50 thereby making them subject to public scrutiny. However, private individuals are generally afforded greater leeway in pursuing defamation
suits.51
Smolla categorizes defamation as a relational harm due to its close similarity
to other business-related harms, such as copyright infringement—it is a harm
against property rights.52 Constitutional scholar Robert Post argues that defamation
law in the United States is built on the metaphor that “reputation is capital.”53 Reputation is the fruit “of one’s own endeavors.”54 Reputation works hand-in-hand with
American capitalism; it can be spent or invested to build up one’s fortune, which,
in turn, can be invested back into one’s good reputation.55 Post argues that in the
United States, the “purpose of the law of defamation is to protect individuals within
the market by ensuring that their reputation is not wrongfully deprived of its proper
market value.”56
However, in many cultures, reputation is viewed as an immutable characteristic
that is inextricably linked to an individual’s sense of honor.57 Post defines the notion
of reputation-as-honor as “a form of reputation in which an individual personally
identifies with the normative characteristics of a particular social role and in return
personally receives from others the regard and estimation that society accords to
that role.”58 This definition of reputation best fits a stratified, hierarchical, or “deference” society rather than a society founded predominantly on market capitalism,
such as the United States.59 Reputation as property is a flexible concept whereby a
person can rebuild lost reputation exactly as she would recuperate a lost fortune:
47. S MOLLA , supra note 18, at 48.
48. See infra notes 61–72.
49. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
50. Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 134 (1967).
51. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974) (holding that “the state interest in compensating injury
to the reputation of private individuals requires that a different rule [other than actual malice] should
obtain with respect to them.”).
52. S MOLLA , supra note 18, at 50.
53. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74
CAL. L. REV. 691, 693 (1986).
54. Id. at 694 (internal quotations omitted).
55. Id. at 695.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 699. See also Brodwyn Fischer, Slandering Citizens: Insults, Class, and Social Legitimacy
in Rio de Janeiro’s Criminal Courts, in HONOR, STATUS, AND LAW IN MODERN LATIN AMERICA
(Sueann Caulfield, Sarah C. Chambers & Lara Putnam, eds., 2005).
58. Post, supra note 53, at 699–700. See also Peter F. Carter-Ruck, Comparative Defamation Law, 6
INT’L LEGAL PRAC. 3, 6 (1981).
59. Post, supra note 53, at 702.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018

9

The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 2 [2018], Iss. 2, Art. 4

No. 2]

Johnson: Beyond Section 230

283

through an entrepreneurial zeal and sound navigation of the market.60 Honor, however, is a fixed concept, because the “value of honor is the value of a meaningful
life.”61 In other words, viewing reputation as honor is more crucially tied to an individual’s identity than when reputation is viewed as property. Thus, one can argue
the stakes are higher for protecting reputation as honor than they are for protecting
reputation as property.
Post’s distinct metaphors for reputation show how defamation straddles the line
between relational harm and reactive harm when viewed in a global context. In the
United States, defamation jurisprudence has moved away from the doctrine of
group defamation (particularly against a racial group) that was once outlawed in
Beauharnais v. Illinois,62 and toward a more reputation-as-capital conception of
defamation.63 Meanwhile, in other countries, the link between defamation and racism, which Smolla defines as a reactive harm, is much closer. For example, Article
5 of the Brazilian constitution enshrines a right to honor and reputation as well as a
right to be free from racism,64 which Brazilian law views as a crime against honor
and dignity.65

C. Reactive Harm
Smolla’s third category, reactive harm, includes intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious invasions of privacy, and any type of hate speech.66 The
Supreme Court has raised the standards for plaintiffs suing under the first two categories by imputing the actual malice standard from Sullivan into many of these
torts, due in large part to their similarity to the tort of defamation.67 Hate speech has
been defined many different ways by many different scholars, but a generic definition for the purposes of this study categorizes hate speech as any speech that attacks
and attempts to subordinate any group or class of people, typically spoken by a
group with a higher level of social power than the targets of the speech.68 The targets
60. Id. at 695.
61. Id. at 701.
62. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
63. Post, supra note 53, at 695.
64. C.F. art. 5 (Braz.) (English version), http://english.tse.jus.br/arquivos/federal-constitution.
65. Lei No. 12.288, de 20 de Julho de 2010, PRESIDÊNCIA DA REPÚBLICA (Braz.) (Statute of Racial
Equality), http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2007-2010/2010/Lei/L12288.htm.
66. S MOLLA , supra note 18, at 50.
67. Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (holding that plaintiffs must prove actual
malice to successfully recover for the tort of false light invasion of privacy); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (holding that a public figure plaintiff must prove actual malice to successfully recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress).
68. See Calvert, supra note 43, at 4 (showing various studies with various definitions of hate speech);
Alexander Tsesis, Dignity and Speech: The Regulation of Hate Speech in a Democracy, 44 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 497, 504 (2009); Richard Delgado & David H. Yun, Essay II. Pressure Valves and
Bloodied Chickens: An Analysis of Paternalistic Objections to Hate Speech Regulation, 82 CAL. L. REV.
871, 878-79 (1994); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court and the Problem of Hate Speech, 24 CAP. U. L.
REV. 281, 290 (1995); Stephanie Farrior, Molding the Matrix: The Historical and Theoretical Foundations of International Law Concerning Hate Speech, 14 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1 (1996); Jean-Marie
Kamatali, The U.S. First Amendment Versus Freedom of Expression in Other Liberal Democracies and
How Each Influenced the Development of International Law on Hate Speech, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 721,
728 (2010); Robert Post, Hate Speech, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 123 (Ivan Hare & James
Weinstein eds., 2009) [hereinafter Hate Speech]; Tanya Katerí Hernández, Hate Speech and the Language of Racism in Latin America: A Lens for Reconsidering Global Hate Speech Restrictions and Legislation Models, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 805, 807–809 (2011).
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of such speech typically include racial minorities, women, religious minorities, and
the LGBTQ community.69 Generally, hate speech is only punishable if it contravenes one of the few First Amendment exceptions listed above.70 According to
Smolla, speech that leads to reactive harms deserves the highest level of constitutional protection due to its tendency to implicate public figures or officials, or its
tendency to involve important social issues and matters of public concern—factors
which greatly outweigh the potential harms of the speech.71
However, other scholars view the reactive harms of hate speech in a more nuanced way in an attempt to craft sound First Amendment doctrine for mitigating
such harms. Professor Cass Sunstein concedes “the line is sometimes thin between
restrictions based on ‘harm’ and restrictions based on viewpoint of content.”72 However, he holds that the primary factor that should determine whether speech is protected “is whether the speech is a contribution to social deliberation, not whether it
has political effects or sources.”73 Thus, Sunstein distinguishes a misogynist tract
from pornographic movies, a racist speech to a crowd from face-to-face racial harassment, and a “tract in favor of white supremacy from a racial epithet.”74
However, Sunstein points out that even within each of those categories, not all
hateful words are equal in their potential to cause reactive harm. He writes, “[i]t is
obtuseness—a failure of perception or empathetic identification—that would enable
someone to say that the word ‘fascist’ or ‘pig’ or even ‘honky’ produces the same
feelings as the word ‘nigger.’”75 A deeper moral point can be made from Sunstein’s
argument: although the many examples of extreme speech listed above receive
strong legal protection due to their theoretical social value, their harms are no less
real to the people who suffer them.
Nevertheless, in First Amendment jurisprudence, reactive harms are considered the least worrisome of harms caused by speech because they are generally considered less tangible than physical or relational harms.76 These latter two categories
implicate life and property, while reactive harms can be reduced to “hurt feelings.”77
69. See Hate Speech, supra note 68.
70. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (holding that a St. Paul, Minn. ordinance
banning symbolic speech (such as cross-burning) that is hateful “on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender”—a content-based restriction of speech—was unconstitutionally under-inclusive); Nat’l
Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (holding that delays in issuing parade
permits to Nazis were, in and of themselves, a content-based restriction on the Nazi Party’s speech);
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (holding that allowing an individual, even a private citizen such
as Mr. Snyder, to sue for civil damages from emotional distress intentionally inflicted by lawful social
speech would lead to a chilling effect on such speech).
71. S MOLLA , supra note 18, at 48.
72. C ASS R. S UNSTEIN , DEMOCRACY AND THE P ROBLEM OF F REE S PEECH 174 (1993).
73. Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. C HICAGO L. R EV . 255, 309 (1992).
74. Id.
75. SUNSTEIN, supra note 72, at 186.
76. C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 998
(1978).
77. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53–55 (1988):
[I]n the world of debate about public affairs, many things done with motives that are less than
admirable are protected by the First Amendment . . . . ‘Outrageousness’ in the area of political and
social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability
on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular
expression. An ‘outrageousness’ standard thus runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow damages to be awarded because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the
audience.
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Certainly, harm to one’s mental well-being is nothing trivial. Many scholars who
have proposed ideas for stronger regulations against hate speech point out that the
damage such speech causes to the well-being of minorities leads to physical (hence,
more important) ailments, such as anxiety and depression, which in turn may make
minorities retreat from participating in society.78 However, the inability to create a
legal test that would show a “direct causal link”79 between speech and mental harms
(like with true threats, incitement, or actual malice) weighs against Smolla’s argument that speech associated with reactive harms often implicates public officials.
This makes speech that causes reactive harms the least deserving of an exception
from First Amendment protection.

D. Harms and Online Speech in a Global
Communication Environment
The three types of harm discussed above reflect the United States’ model for
categorizing and, in some cases, justifying proscription of harmful speech. In sum,
in the United States, unprotected speech must combine a lack of a significant message with the likelihood that some form of harm will befall a targeted recipient.80
For reactive harms, the task of justifying proscription of speech is difficult.81 Here,
Smolla puts forth his “emotion principle,” which claims speech has both emotional
and intellectual effects.82 Under the emotion principle, speech cannot be banned due
to its emotional component alone; the intellectual component must be factored in,
and even the slightest intellectual value will tip the scale in favor of protecting the
speech.83 Thus, banning speech to prevent harm “may not be satisfied by the outrage
or moral opprobrium that a majority of the populace attaches to the activity.”84
Meanwhile, other countries’ legal systems do not package the harms of speech
so neatly into physical, commercial, or emotional categories. For instance, the laws
of some countries view hateful speech as more closely linked to physical harm than
reactive harm. In Brazil, racist speech is criminalized, due in large part to the challenge racism poses to Brazil’s founding narrative that the country is a “racial democracy.”85 Similarly, in the European Union, the experience of Nazism and the

(emphasis added). See generally R ESTATEMENT (S ECOND ) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (AM. LAW. INST.
1965) (“[S]ome degree of transient and trivial emotional distress is a part of the price of living among
people.”).
78. Calvert, supra note 43; see also, Caroline West, Words the Silence? Freedom of Expression and
Racist Hate Speech, in S PEECH & H ARM : C ONTROVERSIES OVER F REE S PEECH 222 (Ishani Maitra &
Mary Kate McGowan eds., 2012).
79. Clay Calvert, Kara Carnley, Brittany Link & Linda Riedmann, Conversion Therapy and Free
Speech: A Doctrinal and Theoretical First Amendment Analysis, 20 WM . & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
525, 539 (2014).
80. Frederick Schauer, Intentions, Conventions, and the First Amendment: The Case of Cross-Burning, 2003 S UP. C T . R EV . 197, 205 (2003).
81. S MOLLA , supra note 18, at 51.
82. Id. at 46.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 10.
85. See Brett G. Johnson, Prejudice Against Being Prejudiced: Racist Speech and the Specter of Seditious Libel in Brazil, 20 C OMM . L. & P OL ’ Y 55 (2015) [hereinafter Prejudice Against Being Prejudiced].
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Holocaust is among the reasons why racist speech is prohibited.86 These countries
also tend to define racist speech in terms of its ability to incite racial hatred and
violence, thereby threatening to throw society into chaos.87
In the area of relational harm, Professor Robert Post argues that the prevailing
interpretation in the United States is that reputation is similar to capital, whereby a
bankrupt reputation, just like one’s lost fortune, has the potential to be rebuilt.88
Such an interpretation is one factor behind the exceptional freedoms given to publishers to prevail in defamation lawsuits against public figures.89 However, Post
contends that countries with cultural interpretations of reputation as a reflection of
a person’s honor tend to have stricter laws governing defamation due to the notion
that one’s honor is irreplaceable if damaged.90 In other words, harm to reputation is
as irreparable as harm to one’s physical self.
Smolla’s clean lines distinguishing the harms of speech are becoming further
strained, if not outright blurred, due to the new and augmented types of harms perpetuated by speech in our networked communication environment. The Internet’s
facilitation of anonymous speech has lowered the social cost for speakers to inflict
all sorts of harm through their online words.91 The reach, permanence, and anonymity of Internet communication have the potential to amplify the physical, relational,
and reactive harms associated with speech.92 Law professor Kent Greenawalt identifies four parts to the incitement standard: (1) the extent of the lawlessness of the
action the speech is advocating; (2) who the speech is being directed at; (3) the
likelihood of the action occurring; and (4) the imminence of the action occurring.93
Each of these factors provides a layer of protection to speech that has the potential
to lead to physical harm.
However, networked communication can allow some types of extreme speech
to surpass each of these protective layers. For example, the requirement that the
communication be directed immediately at an angry audience may no longer be a
sufficient condition for the incited lawless action to be imminent. Professor Lyrissa
Lidsky argues that an inflammatory message posted on social media can target both
intended and unintended audiences who may be more likely than a restive mob to
imminently commit a violent illegal act.94 Others, however, argue the very idea that
almost any controversial or offensive message could be suppressed because of its
tendency to incite someone to violence should galvanize society to maintain its
86. See Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 29, 42–43 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005) (suggesting that the experience of the Holocaust
may explain European legal perspectives toward hate speech).
87. JACOB ROWBOTTOM, Extreme Speech and the Democratic Functions of the Mass Media, in
EXTREME S PEECH AND DEMOCRACY 608, 610 (Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009); Hernández,
supra note 68, at 827; Prejudice Against Being Prejudiced, supra note 85.
88. Post, supra note 53, at 702.
89. See id. at 695.
90. Id.
91. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Incendiary Speech and Social Media, 44 TEXAS TECH L. R EV . 147,
149 (2011). See generally, DANIELLE KEATS C ITRON , HATE C RIMES IN C YBERSPACE (2014); Mary
Anne Franks, Unwilling Avatars: Idealism and Discrimination in Cyberspace, 20 C OLUM . J. GENDER
& L. 224 (2011); Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 86 B.U. L. REV. 61 (2009); Yuval Karniel,
Defamation on the Internet—A New Approach to Libel in Cyberspace, 2 J. INT’L MEDIA & ENTM’T L.
215 (2009).
92. See Lidsky, supra note 91; see also Franks, supra note 91, at 228.
93. Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B. F OUND . R ES . J. 645, 653 (1980).
94. Lidsky, supra note 91, at 149.
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standard of only outlawing the rare case of directly inciting imminent lawless action, online or off.95 The issue of terrorist propaganda presents a thorny dilemma
for this debate. At its very core, such content could be considered political speech—
no different than the speech of other extremist groups advocating for death, destruction, and the overthrow of government. Yet such speech could also prove very successful in recruiting disaffected youths to become terrorists, thereby indirectly inciting violence.
Meanwhile, networked communication has seen the generation of new categories of harmful speech, such as “revenge porn,” which involves posting nude images
online of an ex-romantic partner out of spite, and “cyber-harassment,” which involves persistently inflicting substantial emotional distress against an individual
through online communications.96 Indeed, in a networked communication environment, the reactive harms associated with hate speech have the potential to morph
into physical harms when they take the form of cyber-harassment or abuse of an
individual.97 Despite this rise in the level of harm, few if any legal options exist for
targets of such invectives, shifting the focus from pie-in-the-sky legal remedies to
calling on digital intermediaries to mitigate these harms through self-regulation and
tech-based fixes.98
It is important to unpack this dilemma as it is central to the analysis of this
article. Digital intermediaries must abide by the laws of other countries and the various ways in which they define the harms of speech, both in general and in an online
context.99 So, how do such platforms balance the goal of self-regulation with following the many laws set out before them? Scholars Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu
have suggested the best way to achieve this balance is to create a bordered Internet
where unlawful content can be policed automatically using geolocation.100 However, such a policy neglects the harms of online speech in a country like the United
States where, as will be discussed next, protections against intermediary liability
are very strong. Moreover, it raises the specter of whether lawful and significant
political speech in certain parts of the world could get caught up in the dragnet of
platforms’ automatic policing of allegedly harmful speech according to geolocation.101 To properly conceptualize “platform ethics” and consider the ways in which
intermediaries can balance self-regulation with legal compliance, an understanding
of various models of intermediary liability laws is necessary.

95. See Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Extremist Speech and the Internet: The Continuing Importance
of Brandenberg, 4 HARV . L. & P OL ’ Y R EV . 361, 370 (2010); see also L.A. Powe, Jr., Brandenburg:
Then and Now, 44 TEXAS TECH L. R EV . 69 (2011).
96. See generally C ITRON , supra note 91.
97. Id. at 69; Franks, supra note 91, at 246.
98. See Eric E. Schmidt, Eric Schmidt on How to Build a Better Web, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/07/opinion/eric-schmidt-on-how-to-build-a-better-web.html (calling
on online intermediaries such as Google—the company he cofounded—to create “spell-checkers . . . for
hate and harassment.”).
99. See, e.g., Ronald Deibert & Rafal Rohozinski, Beyond Denial: Introducing Next-Generation Information Access Controls, in ACCESS C ONTROLLED : THE S HAPING OF P OWER, R IGHTS , AND R ULE
IN C YBERSPACE 3 (Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2010); L AURA D E N ARDIS , T HE G LOBAL W AR FOR
INTERNET GOVERNANCE 168 (2014).
100. J ACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU , WHO C ONTROLS THE I NTERNET ? ILLUSIONS OF A
B ORDERLESS WORLD 10 (2006).
101. See infra Part III.A.
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III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Understanding the philosophies behind laws of intermediary liability can enrich the discussion of the potential ethical obligations that intermediaries have when
it comes to dealing with harmful UGC. In particular, one must understand how liability models differ in terms of privileging self-regulation within the industry and
protecting the consumers who use social media platforms. Indeed, the approaches
of the following nine polities vary rather widely on this spectrum. Furthermore,
none are completely static, with several having made major—and not necessarily
clear—shifts in their approach to intermediary liability in recent years.
The preceding discussion of conceptions of harmful speech, particularly in the
context of networked communication, will prove useful in a comparative analysis
of various legal regimes defining intermediary liability in relation to harmful thirdparty speech. Physical, relational, and reactive harms are regarded with varying degrees of severity in the laws of various countries. Social media platforms complicate
the already messy distinctions between these types of harms because, as discussed
above, they can both amplify and blur the lines between these harms. Therefore, the
following comparative analysis should be viewed through the lens of how laws of
intermediary liability view the shifting sands of the harms of speech on social media.102

A. United States Model
The United States’ approach to intermediary liability is enshrined in § 230 of
the 1996 Communications Decency Act (“CDA”).103 The law grants digital intermediaries (which the law refers to as “interactive computer services”) immunity
from civil liability for content published by third parties on its platforms even when
they are notified of the presence of the content or when they choose to take control
over the content and remove it in a “Good Samaritan” act.104 Knowledge of other
types of tortious material does not force intermediaries to remove the material.105 In
the preamble to § 230, Congress declared that digital intermediaries deserve “a minimum of government regulation” because they “offer users a great degree of control
over the information that they receive, as well as the potential for even greater control in the future as technology develops.”106 It called the Internet a “forum for a
true diversity of political discourse,” facilitated by digital intermediaries.107 Congress declared that its intent in passing the law was “to preserve the vibrant and

102. It should be known that these laws apply to intermediaries that are global in scope—such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube—as well as autochthonous platforms. A few examples of the latter type
will be listed infra in each polity’s respective subsection, when applicable.
103. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018).
104. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held
liable on account of . . . any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access” to tortious thirdparty content).
105. See Zeran v. AOL, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that § 230 gave AOL immunity
from liability for defamatory third-party content despite the fact that it had been made aware of the
existence of the content and had taken steps to remove it).
106. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(2), (4).
107. Id. § 230(a)(3).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018

15

The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 2 [2018], Iss. 2, Art. 4

No. 2]

Johnson: Beyond Section 230

289

competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”108
Section 230 is based on two important rationales related to the connection between intermediaries, commerce, and freedom of expression. First, it seeks to protect intermediaries from having to incur the great costs necessary to sift through the
terabytes of content they host and weed out defamatory material, because this could
potentially chill their desire to host otherwise free expression online.109 Second, §
230 seeks to prevent individuals (whether public figures or not) from having an
incentive to serve Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) with potentially successful
requests for taking down content, thus protecting speech from frivolous
takedowns.110
United States case law involving § 230 reinforces Congress’s philosophy on
the broad, speech-friendly benefits of the provision despite its obvious side effect
of allowing potentially harmful speech to flourish. In Zeran v. AOL, the Fourth Circuit stated that § 230, quite simply, was a “policy choice . . . not to deter harmful
speech through the separate route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve
as intermediaries,” thereby “maintain[ing] the robust nature of Internet communication.”111 In DiMeo v. Max, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania averred that “we should expect such [harmful] speech to occur in
a medium in which citizens from all walks of life have a voice.”112
Courts have held that digital intermediaries lose their immunity from liability
under § 230 if they “materially contribute” to the creation of unlawful content on
their platforms. For example, in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.com, the Ninth Circuit held that a dropdown menu allowing users to
select the race and gender of potential roommates sought through Roommates.com
materially contributed to the violation of federal Fair Housing Act.113 However, the
Sixth Circuit held that an employee of a website goading users into posting defamatory statements on the site did not amount to a material contribution to the creation
of that content.114 Together, these cases highlight the power of § 230 in affording
exceptional immunity from liability to platforms.

B. European Model
The goal of focusing on intermediary liability at the supranational level across
the European Union (“EU”) is to allow for key principles and values surrounding
intermediary liability across the continent to be more easily identified.115 Intermediary liability laws of each EU member state will not be the focus of this section.

108. Id. § 230(b)(2).
109. See David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373
(2010).
110. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 (arguing that “notice-based liability for interactive computer service
providers would provide third parties with a no-cost means to create the basis for future lawsuits.”).
111. Id. at 330–31.
112. 433 F. Supp. 2d 523, 533 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
113. 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
114. Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014).
115. According to estimates from StatCounter, U.S. based social media companies (Facebook, Twitter,
etc.) account for more than 99% of all social media use in the EU. See Social Media Stats Europe Sept
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However, attention will be paid to a 2017 German law imposing hefty fines against
social media platforms for unlawful third-party content.
The regime of intermediary liability in the EU is based on Directive
2000/31/EC—the so-called “e-Commerce Directive.”116 Recital 46 of the e-Commerce Directive states digital intermediaries—here referred to as providers of an
“information society service”—benefit from a limitation of liability if “upon obtaining actual knowledge or awareness of illegal activities[, they] act expeditiously
to remove or to disable access to the information concerned.”117 Recital 48 says EU
Member States may “apply duties of care” on digital intermediaries, “which can
reasonably be expected from them and which are specified by national law, in order
to detect and prevent certain types of illegal activities.”118
Various European courts have broadly interpreted “illegal activities” under this
Directive to include content that causes relational or emotional harms,119 such as
defamation, violation of privacy, and hate speech.120 A duty of care is established
when the alleged victim of such harms appropriately notifies the digital intermediaries of the content in question on their platforms, thereby putting these companies
on the legal hook for removing it.121 However, this duty of care is only established
in a notice-and-takedown regime.122 Article 15(1) of the e-Commerce Directive prohibits Member States from “impos[ing] a general obligation on providers . . . to
monitor the information which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.”123 Therefore, European officials can only call on digital intermediaries to follow a moral duty to police
harmful speech published on their platforms, as they did following the 2015 Charlie
Hebdo attacks.124 Meanwhile, the EU’s 2017 Terrorism Directive decrees that “an
effective means of combating terrorism on the Internet is to remove online content

2017 - Sept 2018, S TAT C OUNTER, http://gs.statcounter.com/social-media-stats/all/Europe (last visited
Aug. 26, 2018).
116. Directive 2000/31, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000
O.J. (L 178) 1, 14 (EC).
117. Id. at (46).
118. Id. at (48).
119. S MOLLA , supra note 18, at 48–49.
120. See Timothy Pinto, Niri Shan, Stefan Freytag, Elisabeth von Braunscheig & Velérie Aumage,
Liability of Online Publishers for User Generated Content: A European Perspective, 27 C OMM . LAW .
5 (2010).
121. Marcelo Thompson, Beyond Gatekeeping: The Normative Responsibility of Internet Intermediaries, 18 VAND . J. E NT . & T ECH . L. 783, 806 (2016).
122. Id.
123. Directive 2000/31, art. 15, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal
Market, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EC).
124. Joint Statement of the Ministers of Interior, European Union (Jan. 11, 2015), https://eu2015.lv/images/news/2015_01_11_Joint_statement_of_ministers_for_interrior.pdf. The statement read, in part:
We are concerned at the increasingly frequent use of the Internet to fuel hatred and violence and
signal our determination to ensure that the Internet is not abused to this end, while safeguarding
that it remains, in scrupulous observance of fundamental freedoms, a forum for free expression, in
full respect of the law. With this in mind, the partnership of the major Internet providers is essential
to create the conditions of a swift reporting of material that aims to incite hatred and terror and the
condition of its removing, where appropriate/possible.
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constituting a public provocation to commit a terrorist offence [sic] at its source.”125
The Terrorism Directive stipulates the following:
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure the prompt removal of online content constituting a public provocation to commit a terrorist offence [sic] . . . that is hosted in their territory. They shall also endeavour [sic] to obtain the removal of such content hosted outside their
territory.126
In keeping with the eCommerce Directive, the Terrorism Directive does not
require intermediaries to regularly monitor their platforms for terrorist content.127
The goal of the EU model of intermediary liability, as defined by the laws
above, is to incentivize self-regulation by digital intermediaries by encouraging a
proactive approach whereby companies would actively screen user-generated content and remove the manifestly unlawful material before upset users have a chance
to notify them and thus place them within the prospects of liability.128 Thus, “Only
when contents [are] manifestly unlawful—so that intermediaries would not have to
appreciate their lawfulness—would the latter be required to react and eventually
take them down or restrict access to them.”129 As with § 230, the philosophy behind
the European approach to intermediary liability is that “private regulation is less
dangerous than public regulation when it comes to the defence [sic] of freedom of
expression.”130
However, a 2015 ruling by the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”)
appeared to go against the eCommerce Directive’s policy of prohibiting general
monitoring by intermediaries, throwing the state of intermediary liability law in the
EU into disarray.131 In Delfi AS v. Estonia, a divided Grand Chamber of the ECtHR
held that Delfi, an intermediary that maintained a comment section for news articles
posted on its site, could be held liable for comments that were defamatory,
amounted to hate speech, or incited violence because the intermediary was made
aware and it commercially benefited from the comments.132 The court argued that
an intermediary’s “economic interest in the publication of comments” is no different from a publisher of print material.133

125. Directive 2017/541, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on Combatting Terrorism and Replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council
Decision 2005/671/JHA, 2017 O.J. (L 88) 22 (EU).
126. Id. art. 21 § 1.
127. Id. at (23).
128. Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon, Sometimes One is Not Enough! Securing Freedom of Expression, Encouraging Private Regulation, or Subsidizing Internet Intermediaries or All Three at the Same Time:
The Dilemma of Internet Intermediaries’ Liability, 7 J. INT’L COM. L. & TECH. 154, 164–65 (2012).
129. Id. at 162.
130. Id. at 164.
131. See Lisl Brunner, The Liability of an Online Intermediary for Third Party Content: The Watchdog
Becomes the Monitor: Intermediary Liability after Delfi v. Estonia, 16 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 163, 164
(2016); Bart van der Sloot, The Practical and Theoretical Problems with ‘Balancing’ Delfi, Coty and
the Redundancy of the Human Rights Framework, 23 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 439, 448 (2016).
132. Delfi AS v. Estonia, App. No. 64569/09, 2015 Eur. Ct. H.R. 60–61, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-155105%22]}.
133. Id. at 44.
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Furthermore, the court held that the societal interests in stanching the flow of
hate speech online was justification for holding intermediaries like Delfi liable for
comments posted to their platforms. In particular, the court wrote the following:
[I]n cases such as the present one, where third-party user comments are in
the form of hate speech and direct threats to the physical integrity of individuals . . . the rights and interests of others and of society as a whole may
entitle Contracting States to impose liability on Internet news portals, without contravening Article 10 of the [European] Convention [on Human
Rights protecting the right to freedom of expression], if they fail to take
measures to remove clearly unlawful comments without delay, even without notice from the alleged victim or from third parties.134
However, the court was not unanimous in this conclusion that intermediaries
like Delfi should have such a heavy burden on policing hate speech. Two judges
dissented in the Delfi case and argued that because the majority’s opinion requires
intermediaries to decide between monitoring user comments for racist or defamatory speech or not allowing comments at all, intermediaries will choose the latter,
thus giving them “an invitation to self-censorship at its worst.”135 Although the dissenting judges acknowledged the comments were racist and defamatory and the potential to incite violence were reason enough to prosecute the individuals who
posted them, they argued that Delfi should not be held liable merely for opening up
a discussion forum about issues of public concern and having that forum commandeered by others to express unlawful opinions.136
Meanwhile, in June 2017, Germany passed the Act to Improve the Enforcement
of Rights on Social Networks, also known as the “Network Enforcement Act.”137
The law, which was enacted in October 2017, requires social media networks with
more than two million users to remove UGC that is “clearly illegal” within 24 hours
of receiving a notice from a user about the content.138 If the content is not clearly
illegal, the social network is given seven days to investigate and decide whether or
not it is worthy of deletion.139 The law’s list of illegal content includes propaganda
of unconstitutional organizations, encouragement of violent crimes, and incitement
to hatred.140 The law mandates any social networks that receive more than 100 notifications of infringing content in a year must publish biannual reports regarding
how they handle those notifications.141 A social network that intentionally or negli-

134. Id. at 59–60.
135. Id. at 68 (Sajó, J., & Tsotsoria, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 72–73, 77.
137. See generally Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement Act], June 30,
2017,
Federal
Law
Gazette
at
3352,
(Ger.),
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/netzdg/BJNR335210017.html. For a concise summary of the law in English, see Jenny Gesley,
Germany: Social Media Platforms to Be Held Accountable for Hosted Content Under “Facebook Act”,
LIBR. OF CONGRESS (July 11, 2017), https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/germany-social-media-platforms-to-be-held-accountable-for-hosted-content-under-facebook-act/.
138. Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement Act], June 30, 2017, Federal
Law Gazette at 3353, art. 1 § 3 ¶ 2 no. 2 (Ger.), https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/netzdg/BJNR335210017.html.
139. Id. art. 1 § 3 ¶ 2 no. 3.
140. Id. art. 1 § 1 ¶ 3.
141. Id. art. 1 § 3 ¶ 1.
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gently fails to follow the mandates of the law faces a fine of up to 50 million euros.142 Coupled with the Delfi decision, Germany’s Network Enforcement Act indicates a growing trend in EU law toward strict regulation of digital intermediaries.

C. United Kingdom Model
As the United Kingdom (“UK”) continues its slow yet inevitable exit from the
EU, it is important to study how UK law treats intermediary liability separately from
the EU.143 The UK is also worth studying due to how active the British government
has been in addressing issues related to intermediary liability and mitigating harm
since 2013, and particularly since the phenomenon of fake news became an issue in
2016.144 In January 2018, the UK Department for Digital, Culture, Media, and Sport
published a two-page Digital Charter (the “Charter”) putting forth policy goals for
regulating online intermediaries by establishing “norms and rules for the online
world.”145
The Charter lists three priorities: (1) “protecting people from harmful content
and behaviour [sic], including building understanding and resilience, and working
with industry to encourage the development of technological solutions”; (2) “looking at the legal liability that online platforms have for the content shared on their
sites, including considering how we could get more effective action through better
use of the existing legal frameworks and definitions”; and (3) “limiting the spread
and impact of disinformation intended to mislead for political, personal and/or financial gain.”146 The Charter called on a multi-stakeholder approach for addressing
these priorities that involved self-regulation within the tech industry alongside government regulation.147
Britain is also home to the UK Internet Service Providers’ Association (“ISPA
UK”), a trade organization comprising Britain’s Internet service providers.148 Its
Code of Practice explicitly excludes issues related to third-party content.149 For example, the UK Code encourages members to “use their reasonable endeavours [sic]

142. Id. art. 1 § 4 ¶ 5.
143. According to estimates from StatCounter, U.S. based social media companies (Facebook, Twitter,
etc.) account for more than 99% of all social media use in the UK. See Social Media Stats United Kingdom - September 2018, STATCOUNTER, http://gs.statcounter.com/social-media-stats/all/united-kingdom
(last visited Oct. 7, 2018); see also Market Share Held by the Leading Social Networks in the United
Kingdom (UK) as of July 2018, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/280295/market-shareheld-by-the-leading-social-networks-in-the-united-kingdom-uk/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2018).
144. See generally Intermediary Liability, MEDIA POL’Y PROJECT BLOG, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/tag/intermediary-liability/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2018); see also Closing Date: UK ‘Fake
News’ Inquiry, MEDIA POL’Y PROJECT BLOG (Mar. 3, 2017), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/event/uk-fake-news-inquiry-closes/ (discussing an inquiry launched by the UK Parliament’s Culture, Media and Sport Committee into defining fake news and discussing potential policy solutions for
abating it); Brett G. Johnson, British PM Calls for Nationwide Default Filters to Combat Internet Pornography, 18 SILHA CTR. STUDY MEDIA ETHICS & L. 30 (2013) [hereinafter British PM].
145. UK DEPARTMENT FOR DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA & SPORT, POLICY PAPER: DIGITAL CHARTER
(2018) (UK), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/digital-charter/digital-charter.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See generally ISPA UK, https://www.ispa.org.uk (last visited Oct. 7, 2018).
149. ISPA Code of Practice, INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS’ ASS’N (Apr. 19, 2002) (UK),
napod.org.uk/ispa_code_of_practice.doc.
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to ensure th[at] . . . Services (excluding Third Party Content) and Promotional Material do not contain . . . material inciting violence, cruelty or racial hatred,”150 and
“are not used to promote or facilitate practices which are contrary to UK law.”151
Meanwhile, the only concrete legislation governing intermediary liability in the UK
deals with issues of libel as defined by the 2013 Defamation Act—part of a broad
attempt to reform the UK’s libel laws.152 Section 5 of the Defamation Act stipulates
that a digital intermediary is not liable if it can prove that it was not responsible for
the posting of defamatory statements on its platform.153 However, if the defamed
party notifies the intermediary of the defamatory statements and asks it to remove
them, the intermediary could be held liable for the statements if it fails to remove
them.154 Thus, the UK approach to intermediary liability is similar to the United
States’ approach in that it seeks to privilege self-regulation within the industry rather than state regulation.

D. South African Model
In South Africa,155 the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act of
2002 establishes a notice-and-takedown regime similar to other models discussed
above.156 Intermediaries are required to remove infringing content upon receiving
actual knowledge of it,157 but they have no general obligation to monitor content on
their platforms.158 The law also permits the Director General of the South African
Department of Communications to appoint a “cyber inspector” who has the power
to monitor websites for illegal activity and issue takedown notices.159
The Internet Service Providers Association (“ISPA”) of South Africa, a trade
organization representing all Internet service providers and intermediaries established in South Africa (though not necessarily all those operating in the country),
maintains a Code of Conduct that sets voluntary self-regulatory principles that ensure intermediaries not only comply with the law, but that they do so transparently.160 The Code of Conduct, which was last updated in 2016, states that “[t]here
is no general obligation on any ISPA member to monitor services provided to customers, but a member is obliged to take appropriate action where it becomes aware
of any unlawful content or conduct.”161 The Code of Conduct obliges members to

150. Id. § 2.2.1 (emphasis added).
151. Id. § 2.2.2.
152. Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, §§ 5, 10 (Eng.).
153. Id. § 5(2).
154. Id. § 5(3)(b)-(c).
155. U.S. based social networks dominate in South Africa. See Penetration of Leading Social Networks
in South Africa as of 3rd Quarter 2017, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/284468/south-africa-social-network-penetration/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2018). However, the network 2go, which was
founded in Johannesburg and is currently based out of Cape Town, is a popular autochthonous social
network. See 2GO, http://www.2go.im/.
156. Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 § 75, (S. Afr.), http://www.internet.org.za/ect_act.html.
157. Id.
158. Id. § 78(1).
159. Id. §§ 80, 81.
160. See Code of Conduct, INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS’ ASS’N (June 1, 2016) (S.
Afr.), https://ispa.org.za/code-of-conduct/.
161. Id. § J(26).
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establish clear guidelines for how users can initiate notice-and-takedown procedures, keep records of all requests for removing content, and provide regular reports
on such requests to the ISPA.162
By working in concert with South African law governing intermediaries, the
Code of Conduct is designed to hold intermediaries accountable for their actions by
ensuring that they do not remove too much or too little content. In doing so, the
Code of Conduct offers a means for intermediaries to balance the competing goals
of promoting free expression and preventing the proliferation of harmful UGC. By
governing ISPs’ practices toward handling third-party content, the South African
ISPA is distinct from the ISPA UK, which, as noted above, explicitly excludes issues related to third-party content from its Code of Conduct.163 However, it is similar to the UK approach to intermediary liability in that it seeks to incentivize selfregulation over state regulation.

E. Australian Model
Outside of the realm of copyright law, Australia has no specific legislation
dealing with intermediary liability in the harmful third-party context.164 Thus,
judge-made law has defined the contours of intermediary liability in Australia, and
courts have been inconsistent on recent issues. One example of conflicting common
law is on the issue of whether Google is considered a publisher of, and therefore
considered liable for, defamatory search results. In Trkulja v. Google, the Supreme
Court of Victoria held that Google is considered a publisher in the context of search
results.165 In particular, the court held that because employees of Google possess
“skill and expertise . . . employed by Google for the purpose of creating a search
engine,” and because “Google intends its search engines to publish material on the
[I]nternet in response to user queries,” Google must be considered a publisher.166
The court called Google’s argument an attempt to “confer immunity out of thin
air,”167 and held “[i]f Google is to have immunity from suit, it must be bestowed
upon it by the legislature.”168
However, the Supreme Court of New South Wales held in a separate case that
Google is not considered a publisher of defamatory search results because the
search results are generated via algorithm, not human activity.169 Like the Victoria
Supreme Court in Trkulja, the New South Wales court acknowledged algorithms
were created by humans, but the latter disagreed that this connection rose to the
level of human activity required for Google to be considered a publisher.170 The
New South Wales court noted that because the individual notified Google of the
162. Id. §§ J(29)-(31).
163. ISPA Code of Practice, INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS’ ASS’N (Apr. 19, 2002)
(UK), napod.org.uk/ispa_code_of_practice.doc.
164. U.S. based social media firms dominate the Australian market, accounting for more than 99% of
the country’s social media use. See generally David Cowling, Social Media Statistics Australia – April
2018, SOCIALMEDIANEWS (May 1, 2018), https://www.socialmedianews.com.au/social-media-statistics-australia-april-2018/.
165. Trkulja v Google Inc. [2015] VSC 635 (17 November 2015) 67 (Austl.).
166. Id. at 54.
167. Id. at 77.
168. Id. at 75.
169. Bleyer v Google Inc., [2014] NSWSC 897, 83-85 (12 August 2014) (Austl.).
170. Id. at 83.
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posts and asked to have them removed, that might turn Google into a publisher
under Australian law, thereby making it liable for the posts.171 However, the court
held that because the plaintiff claimed only three people in Australia saw the defamatory search results, the cost of holding Google responsible for the search results
outweighed any benefits from mitigating any harms in doing so—in other words,
the case was dismissed for lack of proportionality.172
It is illustrative to contrast both of these cases with a case involving defamatory
statements made on a website with a much smaller operation than Google’s. In Piscioneri v. Brisciani, the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory held that
an individual who ran a website that contained defamatory posts from users, and
who encouraged users to make those posts, must be considered a publisher and thus
liable for the posts of the users on his site.173 Thus, according to Australian case
law, the line distinguishing the terms of liability for global intermediaries such as
Google and local small-time intermediaries appears to be faded, gray, and porous.

F. Brazilian Model
In Brazil,174 intermediary liability is codified in a 2014 law known as the
“Marco Civil da Internet” (the “Marco Civil”).175 Roughly translated as an “Internet
Bill of Rights,” the statute establishes, among other things, that Brazilian citizens
have a right to net neutrality.176 The Marco Civil lists a special provision under
Article 21 for the phenomenon of “revenge porn,” whereby intermediaries will be
held criminally liable if they either purposefully host or fail to remove revenge porn
photos on their platforms.177 Articles 18 and 19 of the Marco Civil provide that
digital intermediaries are immune from civil liability for third-party content unless
they fail to remove defamatory or racist content after receiving a valid court order
asking them to do so.178 The connection between defamation and racism in this law
should not be overlooked.
Section 3 of Article 140 in Brazil’s Penal Code states the following: “If [a]
defamatory act involves the use of references to race, color, ethnicity, religion,
origin, elderly status[,] or disability” the penalty will be “imprisonment of one to
three years and a fine.”179 A 1997 anti-racism law reiterates Brazil’s intention to

171. Id. at 85–87.
172. Id. at 62.
173. Brisciani v Piscioneri [No. 4] (2016) ACTCA 32, 17 (Austl.), 2016 WL 4239922. The facts in
this case are analogous to those in Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recording, LLC. See Jones v.
Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 415–16 (6th Cir. 2014).
174. U.S. based WhatsApp and Facebook dominate the Brazilian social media market. See Brazil: Most
Popular Social Network Apps as of June 2017, S TATISTA , https://www.statista.com/statistics/746969/most-popular-social-networkapps-brazil/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2018).
175. Lei No. 12.965, de 23 de Abril de 2014, CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] (Braz.). See Alexandre Pontieri,
Título: Marco Civil da Internet - Neutralidade de Rede e Liberdade de Expressão, JUS.COM.BR (July
2018), https://jus.com.br/artigos/67822/titulo-marco-civil-da-internet-neutralidade-de-rede-e-liberdadede-expressao.
176. Lei No. 12.965 art. 3 § IV.
177. Id. art. 21.
178. Id. art. 18, 19.
179. Lei No. 2.848, de 7 de Dezembro de 1940, CÓDIGO PENAL [C.P.] (Braz.).
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enforce racism as a defamatory crime, or a “crime against honor.”180 Indeed, Brazilian law views racism as anathema to the identity of the Brazilian nation, and thus
punishes racism under the philosophy that it is akin to seditious libel.181
One particular example of action taken against a digital intermediary (albeit
prior to the passing of the Marco Civil) is illustrative of the Brazilian context of
intermediary liability. In September 2012, two videos appeared on YouTube alleging Alcides Bernal—mayoral candidate for the city of Campo Grande in the Brazilian state of Mato Grosso do Sul—hated poor people, unlawfully enriched himself,
paid an ex-lover to abort a child he fathered, denied being the child’s father after he
was born, and then beat the child after finally admitting he was the father.182 Bernal
filed a lawsuit against Google Brazil, the owner and operator of YouTube in Brazil,
for publishing defamatory electoral propaganda against him in the run-up to an election, which is a violation of Article 243 of the Brazilian Electoral Code.183
Wanting to uphold the rules for conducting free and fair elections as painstakingly defined in the Electoral Code, Judge Flávio Saad Perón of the 35th Electoral
Zone of the municipality of Campo Grande—a division of the Regional Electoral
Court, known as the Tribunal Regional Eleitoral of the state of Mato Grosso do
Sul—ordered the video be taken down.184 However, the head of Google Brazil, Fabio José Silva Coelho, refused to obey the order, citing a commitment to upholding
the values of free speech.185 Judge Saad then ordered Coelho placed under house
arrest for disobeying a judge’s order—a violation of Article 347 of the Electoral
Code—and ordered a 24-hour suspension of all Google and YouTube services in
the state.186 The judge’s order attracted national and international media attention
on the otherwise ordinary and relatively insignificant election.187 Google Brazil released a statement saying it was “appealing the decision that ordered the removal
of the YouTube video because, in being a platform, Google is not responsible for

180. Hernández, supra note 68, at 828. See Lei No. 9.459, de 13 de Maio de 1997, CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.]
(Braz.).
181. See Prejudice Against Being Prejudiced, supra note 85, at 57.
182. Bryan Bishop, Google Complies with Brazilian Court Order to Pull Political Video from YouTube,
VERGE (Sept. 27, 2012, 9:06 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2012/9/27/3420574/google-youtube-brazil-court-order-pulls-political-video; see also Brad Hayes, Google Exec Questioned Over Brazil Election
Video, REUTERS (Sept. 26, 2012, 4:45 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/net-us-google-brazil/google-exec-questioned-over-brazil-election-videoidUSBRE88P1OX20120926?feedType=RSS&feedName=technologyNews&utm_source=feedburner&
utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+reuters%2FtechnologyNews+%28Reuters+Technology+News%29.
183. Felipe Correa, Brazil Confronts Google – and it’s Personal, FREE SPEECH DEBATE (Nov. 1, 2012),
http://freespeechdebate.com/case/brazil-confronts-google-and-its-personal/. See Lei No. 4.737, de 15 de
Julho de 1965, CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] art. 243, de 09.04.1964 (Braz.).
184. Bishop, supra note 182.
185. Reuters, Top Google Executive in Brazil Faces Arrest over Video, N.Y. T IMES (Sept. 25, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/26/business/global/top-google-executive-in-brazil-faces-arrestover-video.html.
186. Adi Robertson, Brazilian Judge Orders Arrest of Local Google President Over Negative Election
(Sept.
25,
2012,
2:09
PM),
https://www.thevVideos
on
YouTube,
VERGE
erge.com/2012/9/25/3406238/brazil-google-president-arrest. See Lei No. 4.737, de 15 de Julho de 1965,
CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] art. 347, de 09.04.1964 (Braz.).
187. Brazilian Police Detain Local Google President, BBC (Sept. 27, 2012),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19737364.
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the content posted on its site.”188 The company did not comment on Coelho’s arrest.
However, on September 26, 2012, Google removed the videos from YouTube.189
The philosophical foundation of the Brazilian approach to intermediary liability is based on the Brazilian Consumer Protection Code (“CPC”) of 1990,190 which
lays out numerous rights of consumer protection. The philosophical thrust of the
CPC is that consumers deserve protection from businesses because, ultimately, consumers are the reason businesses are in business to begin with; in other words, consumers deserve a substantial amount of legal power over the businesses that profit
off of them.191 In the context of intermediary liability, the theory is that because
online communication platforms profit off of users by commodifying both their
content and their data, these platforms should ultimately respond to users when this
venture turns harmful.192 This philosophy parallels the reasoning in the ECtHR’s
Delfi decision that the commercial incentive of intermediaries to profit off of harmful speech demands a legal remedy to de-incentivize the facilitation of such
speech.193 Therefore, the Brazilian approach to intermediary liability can be viewed
as heavily favoring consumer protection over affording immunity to platforms, even
in spite of the fact that significant political speech may be chilled to achieve that
end.

G. Indian Model
In India,194 Article 79 of the country’s Information Technology (“IT”) Act of
2008 stipulates that a digital intermediary is not held liable for third-party content
except when it either materially contributes to the creation of the content, or if it
receives actual knowledge that the content is unlawful.195 In 2011, the Indian government published the “Information Technology (Intermediary guidelines) Rules”
in its official gazette to further define what might make third-party content unlawful.196 This includes content that “is grossly harmful, harassing, blasphemous, defamatory, obscene, pornographic, paedophilic [sic], libelous, invasive of another’s
privacy, hateful, or racially [or] ethnically objectionable, disparaging, relating or
encouraging money laundering or gambling, or otherwise unlawful in any manner
whatever.”197
188. Megan Geuss, Google’s Brazil Chief Detained by Federal Police Over YouTube Video, ARS
TECHNICA (Sept. 26, 2012, 9:20 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/09/googles-brazil-chiefdetained-by-federal-police-over-youtube-video/.
189. Bishop, supra note 182.
190. Complying with Brazil’s Consumer Protection Code, DIAZREUS (Jan. 27, 2012), http://diazreus.com/complying-with-brazils-consumer-protection-code/. See Lei No. 8.078, de 11 de Setembro de
1990, CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] (Braz.).
191. Nicolo Zingales, The Brazilian Approach to Internet Intermediary Liability: Blueprint for a
Global Regime?, 4 INTERNET P OL ’ Y R EV . 1 (2015).
192. Id.
193. Delfi AS v. Estonia, App. No. 64569/09, 2015 Eur. Ct. H.R. 69, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-155105%22]}.
194. Although Facebook, Twitter and Instagram are dominate the Indian social media market, the autochthonous social network Hike is very popular among Indian Internet users. See Anish Gawande, This
App is Changing the Way Millions of Indians Use the Internet, CNN (Aug. 3, 2017, 11:28 AM),
195. The Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008, No. 10 § 79, Acts of Parliament, 2009
(India).
196. Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011, Gazette of India, pt. II sec. 3(i),
13-14 (Apr. 11, 2011).
197. Id. § 3(2)(b).
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According to the 2011 guidelines, intermediaries must follow “due diligence”
to remove unlawful material.198 The doctrine of due diligence comes from the realm
of Indian business law and has many meanings, none of which have been clearly
defined by a court or codified by a statute.199 However, for the purposes of understanding the Indian philosophy behind intermediary liability, the doctrine of due
diligence essentially means that once a company becomes aware that it is profiting
off of the unlawful practices of a business partner, it must cease those unlawful
business activities.200 To illustrate this principle, in 2008, the Delhi High Court in
dicta condemned a website that placed the maximization of profits over “[s]afeguard[ing] . . . prevailing moral values” in regard to its business model of profiting
off of spreading links to obscene material.201 Similarly, in July 2018, the Indian
government warned the message-sharing platform WhatsApp that it could not escape accountability and responsibility for false rumors spread by users that led to
the lynching deaths of 18 people.202 Thus, the philosophy behind the Indian model
of intermediary liability is similar to that of both the Brazilian model and the Delfi
decision, whereby dutifully treating consumers is encouraged.203

H. Japanese Model
In Japan,204 Act No. 137 of 2001 (the Act on the Limitation of Liability for
Damages of Specified Telecommunications Service Providers and the Right to Demand Disclosure of Identification Information of the Senders, hereinafter referred
to as the “Act”) governs intermediary liability in Japan.205 Article 3 of the Act explains that digital intermediaries “shall not be liable for any loss incurred” from an
infringement of a user’s rights (namely, to reputation and privacy), “unless where
it is technically possible to take measures for preventing such information from being transmitted to unspecified persons.”206
The Act is similar to § 230 in that it assures intermediaries that act to stop an
infringement, whether proactively or upon receiving notice, do not open themselves
up to liability.207 However, like some other legal regimes discussed here, the Act
198. Id. § 3.
199. See Legal Due Diligence, I NT ’L F IN . L. R EV . (July 12, 2001), http://www.iflr.com/Article/2027418/Legal-due-diligence.html.
200. See, e.g., James Grandolfo, Ajit Sharma, Vandana Shroff, H. Jayesh & Kavita Mohan, India, 44
INT ’L LAW . 663, 673 (2010).
201. Avnish Bajaj v. State, (2008) 150 DLT 279 (India).
202. India Lynchings: WhatsApp Sets New Rules After Mob Killings, BBC (July 20, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-44897714.
203. See Rajinder Kaur & Rashmi Aggarwal, Cyber Crime in India: An Analysis of the Regulatory
Framework, 20 C OMPUT . & TELECOMM . L. R EV . 17 (2014).
204. U.S. based Instagram, Twitter, and Facebook dominate the social media market in Japan. See
Caylon Neely, Japan’s Top Social Media Networks for 2018, HUMBLE B UNNY (Jan. 29, 2018),
http://www.humblebunny.com/japans-top-social-media-networks-2018/. However, the autochthonous
social messaging app Line is very popular in the country. See Jon Russell, Understanding Line, the Chat
App Behind 2016’s Largest Tech IPO, TECH C RUNCH , https://techcrunch.com/2016/07/14/understanding-line-the-chat-app-behind-2016s-largest-tech-ipo/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2018).
205. Act on the Limitation of Liability for Damages of Specified Telecommunications Service Providers and the Right to Demand Disclosure of Identification Information of the Senders Act, Law No. 137
of 2001 (Japan), http://www.unesco.org/culture/pdf/anti-piracy/Japan/Jp_%20LimitLiability_Telecom_en.
206. Id. art. 3(1).
207. Id. art. 3(2).
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stipulates that intermediaries lose immunity from liability if they have knowledge
of an infringement and do not take action.208 Act No. 137 also goes a step further in
empowering users by granting alleged victims of infringement the right to demand
that intermediaries hand over information about the alleged infringing parties, including their names and addresses, provided that they have sufficient evidence to
show the specific party infringed upon their rights.209 In the spirit of due process,
the intermediaries are further required to notify the alleged infringers that their information is being sought.210 Thus, the Japanese approach to intermediary liability
appears to balance competing interests of platforms and users in a spirit of social
responsibility.

I. South Korean Model
In South Korea,211 intermediary liability is rooted in Article 44 of the Act on
the Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, which gives a rather detailed account of what such liability must
look like.212 First, Article 44 broadly stipulates that “[n]o user may circulate any
information violating another person’s rights, including invasion of privacy and
defamation, through an information and communications network,” and “[e]very
provider of information and communications services shall make efforts to prevent
any [such] information . . . from being circulated through the information and communications network operated and managed by it.”213 Doing so will lead to the intermediary’s liability being “mitigated or discharged.”214
Second, Article 44 states that the victim of an “invasion of privacy or defamation” has the right to demand a deletion of the infringing content, as well as a right
to a rebuttal, provided he or she can furnish evidence of the violation.215 When such
a situation arises, the intermediary must post a public notice on its platform that the
situation occurred and that it is attempting to rectify it.216 If the intermediary is unsure of whether the content was infringing, it can temporarily deny access to the
content for up to 30 days.217
Third, Article 44 states that if an intermediary voluntarily removes content that
is defamatory or invades a user’s privacy, it will not have assumed liability for the
content; this puts the Korean intermediary liability regime on par with several others

208. Id. art. 3(1)(ii).
209. Id. art. 4(1).
210. Id. art. 4(2).
211. Although Facebook and Twitter are gaining ground in the South Korean social media market, the
autochthonous social networks KakaoStory and Cyworld retain very high levels of penetration among
Korean Internet users. See Explained: The Unique Case of Korean Social Media, L INKFLUENCE (July
28, 2017), https://linkfluence.com/the-unique-case-of-korean-social-media/.
212. Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, Etc., Act No. 9119, June 13, 2008, art. 44 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research
Institute
online
database,
http://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_mobile/viewer.do?hseq=38422&type=sogan&key=41.
213. Id.
214. Id. art. 44-2(6).
215. Id. art. 44-2(1) (Request for Deletion of Information).
216. Id. art. 44-2(2).
217. Id. art. 44-2(4).
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discussed here in terms of offering a “Good Samaritan” clause for platforms.218 Finally, Article 44 stipulates that upon an order from the government, intermediaries
must remove several types of unlawful content, including obscene material, defamatory messages, content that “arouses fear or apprehension,” content that “divulges
a state secret,” and content that that “aides or abets in the committing of a criminal
act.”219
Until 2010, intermediaries were subject to liability if they failed to maintain
procedures for unmasking users who fraudulently use another user’s identity.220 If
intermediaries with “more than 100,000 users” did not routinely furnish this information when requested, they were mandated by a 2005 law to require users to post
comments under their real names.221 However, in 2012, the Korean Constitutional
Court held that this provision of Article 44 was unconstitutional because it chilled
individuals’ anonymous speech without sufficiently fulfilling the provision’s goal
of minimizing harms resulting from anonymous speech.222 Despite this ruling, the
Korean model, like the Japanese model, mandates that intermediaries must “furnish
the name and address” of a user who “defames or violates the privacy” rights of
another user if the latter can prove he or she can prevail in a civil or criminal defamation proceeding.223 The victim receiving the “information may not use the information for any purpose other than filing a civil or criminal complaint.”224
In 2012, the Korean Constitutional Court upheld the constitutionality of Article
44, holding that the notice-and-takedown regime it established did not unreasonably
infringe upon freedom of expression.225 The court held Article 21 of the Korean
Constitution,226 which mandates that freedom of expression enjoyed by media companies must not infringe upon the individual rights of citizens (e.g., to honor and
privacy) applied to digital intermediaries, and that the provisions of Article 44 imposed only minimal restrictions on freedom of expression.227 The court also noted

218. Id. art. 44-3(1) (Discretionary Temporary Measures).
219. Id. art. 44-7(1) (Prohibition on Circulation of Unlawful Information).
220. Id. art. 44-5(1) (Verification of Identity of Users of Open Message Boards).
221. Public Official Election Act, Act No, 7681, Aug. 4, 2005 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation
Research
Institute
online
database,
http://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_mobile/viewer.do?hseq=38422&type=sogan&key=41. See K.S. Park & Da Young Chung, Mandatory Identity Verification in the Internet: Did Google Do the Right Thing?, 5 KOR. U. L. R EV . 203, 207 (2009).
222. Identity Verification System on Internet [Const. Ct.], 2010Hun-Ma252 (consol.), Aug. 23, 2012,
(2012 KCCR, 590) (S. Kor.).
223. Act of Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, Etc., Act No. 9119, Jun. 13, 2008, art. 44-6(1) (S. Kor.) (Claim to Furnish User’s Information).
224. Id. art. 44-6(3).
225. Article 44-2. Paragraph 2 of the Act of Promotion of Information Network Usage and Information
Protection, etc. [Const. Ct.], 2010Hun-Ma88 (consol.), May 31, 2012, (KCCR, 578) (S. Kor.).
226. Amended 1987 Daehanminkuk Hunbeob [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 21(4) (S. Kor.):
(1) All citizens shall enjoy freedom of speech and the press, and freedom of assembly and association.
(2) Licensing or censorship of speech and the press, and licensing of assembly and association
shall not be permitted.
(3) The standards of news service and broadcast facilities and matters necessary to ensure the
functions of newspapers shall be determined by Act.
(4) Neither speech nor the press shall violate the honor or rights of other persons nor undermine
public morals or social ethics. Should speech or the press violate the honor or rights of other persons, claims may be made for the damage resulting therefrom.
227. Article 44-2. Paragraph 2 of the Act of Promotion of Information Network Usage and Information
Protection, etc. [Const. Ct.], 2010Hun-Ma88 (consol.), May 31, 2012, (KCCR, 578) (S. Kor.).
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that Article 44 was good policy because it allowed digital intermediaries the opportunity to avoid costlier damages should they be found liable of facilitating UGC that
either defamed or invaded the privacy of other users.228 The court also stressed the
purpose of Article 44 was to protect individual users who found themselves victims
of infringing content, and that it could not be invoked to squelch speech critical of
the government.229
In 2014,230 and again in 2015, the Korean Constitutional Court also upheld the
constitutionality of the provision of Article 44 requiring intermediaries to remove
content that divulges state secrets when notified by the Korea Communications
Commission.231 All told, the South Korean approach to intermediary liability—
much like the Japanese model—appears to balance the competing interests of consumer protection and due process for freedom of expression, and it affords platforms a reasonable degree of immunity from liability.

J. Concluding Thoughts on the Comparative Analysis
The nine models above are not a complete representation of how democratic
polities conceive of the laws of intermediary liability in the context of extreme
speech. However, they do reveal points along a spectrum. At one end, intermediaries are afforded exceptional immunity from liability; at the other, these platforms
are subject to a strict notice-and-takedown regime when it comes to extreme UGC.
Understanding this spectrum is key to distilling a set of principles for ethical operations by social media platforms.
The United States model of § 230 sits on the former end of the spectrum. Platforms in the United States only face liability for harmful UGC when they materially
contribute to its creation.232 This model affords platforms a high degree of control
over users’ content with little responsibility for it,233 and some have argued this is
the main impetus for the success of United States social networks and other platforms that traffic in UGC.234 Moving along the spectrum, the UK and South African
models share the goals of the United States model of promoting self-regulation
among platforms, though the latter two models more actively encourage self-regulation through government-supported, non-binding codes of conduct.
On the opposite end of the spectrum are the Brazilian and Indian models, which
see social networks as directly responsible for facilitating harmful UGC rather than
mere neutral platforms. The Japanese and South Korean models fall somewhere in
the middle of the spectrum, seeking to balance the goals of ensuring the commercial
228. Id. at 11.
229. Id. at 12.
230. Removal of Posts Containing Unlawful Information Case [Const. Ct.], 2012Hun-Ba325, Sept. 25,
2014, (2014 KCCR, 466) (S. Kor.).
231. Jinbo Network Center v. Korea Communications Commission [S. Ct.], 2012Du26432, Mar. 26,
2015 (S. Kor.).
232. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.
2008); Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014).
233. See Sandra Braman & Stephanie Lynch, Advantage ISP: Terms of Service as Media Law, 5 NEW
MEDIA & SOC’Y 422 (2003).
234. See, e.g., Ardia, supra note 109; Jonathan W. Peters & Brett G. Johnson, Conceptualizing Private
Governance in a Networked Society, 18 N ORTH C AROLINA J. L. & T ECH . 15, 22–23 (2016); James
Grimmelmann, The Internet Is a Semicommons, 78 F ORDHAM L. R EV . 2799 (2010). See generally
LAWRENCE L ESSIG , C ODE : V ERSION 2.0 (2006).
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success of platforms, promoting robust participation by users, and protecting users
from undue harm caused by UGC. Meanwhile, the EU model appears to be shifting
more toward the Brazilian and Indian models by placing more liability on platforms
out of a spirit of consumer protection. The German “Network Enforcement Act,” as
well as the 2015 Delfi decision, show the EU moving in this direction. Meanwhile,
the messiness of the Australian model reveals how much in flux the issue of intermediary liability for harmful UGC is. Indeed, even the United States model is not
immune from this trend toward skepticism of social media platforms.235 Whether
this trend results in the revision of § 230 remains to be seen. In the meantime, it
would be wise for platforms to follow several ethical principles that can be distilled
from the intermediary laws reviewed above. This article now turns to address those
principles.

IV. SYNTHESIS: PLATFORM ETHICS INFORMED BY LAW
As I noted earlier, I have called elsewhere for scholars and industry leaders to
conceptualize possible versions of “platform ethics,” or the notion that digital intermediaries maintain some kind of duty to their users.236 In particular, I argue that
three factors should be taken into account when defining platforms ethics: (1) the
extent to which intermediaries maximize the speaking power of individual users;
(2) the extent to which intermediaries mitigate against unnecessary harm against
users; and (3) the extent to which intermediaries facilitate the goals of democracy.
Ultimately, the goal is for platforms and users to decide what is the proper balance.
To this calculus, digital intermediaries can add the goals of avoiding legal regulation
and streamlining costs.
This goal assumes that digital intermediaries are media institutions owing the
same duty to democracy as newspapers and broadcasters, even though they might
want to consider themselves merely tech companies that are value-neutral.237 This
proposition is not new. Before social media platforms were common phenomena,
Professor Stephanie Craft called on large media conglomerates to recognize a duty
to their audiences (i.e., the public) due in no small part to the notion that the framers
of the Constitution “thought of the press as an entity whose purpose was not solely
or even predominantly profit generation, but public service.”238 Similarly, Professors David Allen and Elizabeth Hindman have argued that media ethics should be
a concept built on an institutional level, with the key focus of inquiry being how
235. See, e.g., Dan Levine & Kristina Cooke, Tech Industry’s Legal Shield is Feeling the Heat,
REUTERS (Aug. 18, 2016, 12:05 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tech-courtidUSKCN10T0ET; Alfred Ng, Tech Giants to Congress: Sorry About Our mistakes, But There’s No
Bias, CNET (July 18, 2018, 7:18 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/tech-giants-tell-congress-theyrenot-censoring-with-a-political-bias/; Nicholas Conlon, Freedom to Filter Versus User Control: Limiting
the Scope of § 230(c)(2) Immunity, 2014 U. ILLINOIS J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 105, 109 (2014); C ITRON,
supra note 91.
236. Speech, Harm and the Duties of Digital Intermediaries, supra note 5, at 20.
237. See Brett G. Johnson & Kim Kelling, Placing Facebook: “Trending,” “Napalm Girl,” “Fake
News” and Journalistic Boundary Work, 12 J OURNALISM P RACTICE 817 (2018) (finding that journalists have sought to discursively construct Facebook as a media institution rather than a tech company so
that the company can be forced to abide by the same ethical principles as journalists when dealing with
harmful third-party content).
238. G. Stuart Adam, Stephanie Craft & Elliot D. Cohen, Three Essays on Journalism and Virtue, 19
J. MASS MEDIA E THICS 247, 265 (2004).
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media companies devote their resources to the betterment of society and the fulfillment of democratic ideals.239
Professor Michael Perkins reminds us that the fundamental difference between
law and ethics is that the “law sets a minimum standard below which our actions
must not fall,” while “ethics sets a higher standard to which we ought to aspire.”240
The legal regimes analyzed here offer some clues as to how platform ethics might
be conceptualized through distilling moral values from legal principles that balance
well with one another and lead intermediaries to engage in practices that go beyond
minimum standards set by law.
First, platforms should recognize that they are dependent on users, not the other
way around. In contrast to § 230, intermediary liability regimes in other parts of the
world tend to impose less immunity to digital intermediaries. Namely, a “social
theory of responsibility” in which “control capability [over content] implies co-responsibility” (morally, if not legally, speaking) distinguishes these regions from the
United States.241 The non-United States regimes view individual citizens as the most
important stakeholders in a networked economy that thrives on facilitating public
discourse, but from a different perspective than United States law.
Generally, these legal regimes tend to view digital intermediaries as being dependent upon individuals, and they acknowledge the fact that digital intermediaries
commoditize the speech of individuals for profit.242 For example, notions particularly present in the European, Brazilian, and Indian regimes of intermediary liability—that platforms have unscrupulous profit motives behind allowing third-party
content, even some of the most harmful types—should translate into an ethical principle that the ability of intermediaries to profit off of individuals ends when that
profit is steeped in harmful content. Therefore, notions of a duty of care, present in
all of the regulatory models examined here except § 230, can translate into an ethical
duty that intermediaries should follow in their relations with users.
Second, intermediaries should recognize the potential of users’ speech to foster
deliberative democracy online, and thus they should follow ethical precepts that
would seek to turn their platforms into spaces where robust public debate can occur
amid a genuine ethos of trust between users and the intermediaries. Such a position
would transcend the “aggregational” concept of freedom of expression that platforms currently practice, a concept that fits well with the business model of intermediaries but not with their role in democracy.243
This second goal stems from the values enshrined particularly in the United
States’ § 230. Section 230 provides much greater protection for speech than the
others analyzed here.244 This easy distinction comes from the fact that the foreign
approaches analyzed involve notice-based liability, whereas notice does not trigger

239. David S. Allen & Elizabeth Blanks Hindman, The Media and Democracy: Using Democratic
Theory in Journalism Ethics, in THE ETHICS OF J OURNALISM : I NDIVIDUAL , I NSTITUTIONAL AND
C ULTURAL INFLUENCES 185, 186–203 (Wendy N. Wyatt ed., 2014).
240. Perkins, supra note 12, at 195.
241. Tomas A. Lipinski, Elizabeth A. Buchanan & Johannes J. Britz, Sticks and Stones and Words that
Harm: Liability vs. Responsibility, Section 230 and Defamatory Speech in Cyberspace, 4 ETHICS &
INFO . TECH . 143, 156 (2002).
242. See Ganaele Langlois, Participatory Culture and the New Governance of Communication: The
Paradox of Participatory Media, 14 TELEVISION & N EW MEDIA 91 (2012).
243. Facebook’s Free Speech Balancing Act, supra note 7, at 36.
244. See Pinto et al., supra note 120, at 5.
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liability under § 230.245 On the other hand, the somewhat paradoxical tradeoff of
prioritizing the protection of speech on social media platforms is that the law may
be affording so much protection to these intermediaries that they control more
speech than § 230 intended.
Professor Sandra Braman argues that digital intermediaries, in hypocritical and
self-contradictory fashion, “do not want to be content providers but do want to control all content,” and that § 230 effectively gives them “control without liability.”246
Intermediaries seek to be “rewarded for facilitating expression but not liable for its
excesses.”247 Similarly, Professor Rebecca Tushnet and Professor Dawn Nunziato
argue that § 230 gives digital intermediaries too much of an incentive to control
speech.248 The argument goes that if intermediaries are able, under § 230, to proactively remove objectionable content without fear of liability, they will do so to the
detriment of individuals’ ability to speak freely on these platforms.249 Tushnet accuses this legal regime of “simultaneously supporting freedom and suppression,”250
and posits that “if we limit intermediary responsibility . . . we should also limit
intermediary power to control speech.”251 In other words, digital intermediaries face
a dilemma under the § 230 regime: they can protect speech and be accused of not
doing enough to prevent harm, or they can remove harmful content at the request
of individuals and be accused of not doing enough to protect speech.252
Third, platforms should act with transparency regardless of what decisions they
make on governing third-party content. This goal is particularly evident in the South
African ISPA Code, but it is also present in the Japanese and South Korean provisions requiring intermediaries to notify users who posted infringing content that
their content was being removed or that their identities were being revealed to the
alleged victims of the content.253 Even in the rather draconian German Network
Enforcement Law, the spirit of transparency behind filing records with a government agency on how platforms handle unlawful third-party content should live on
in a conception of platform ethics.
What would these ethical principles look like in practice? For starters, although
it might seem that following an ethical policy of mitigating harmful third-party content would require regular monitoring, I do not propose that platforms adopt the

245. See supra notes 103–110.
246. Braman & Lynch, supra note 233, at 438 (emphasis in original).
247. Tarleton Gillespie, The Politics of ‘Platforms’, 12 NEW MEDIA & S OC’ Y 347, 356 (2010).
248. Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First Amendment, 76
GEO . W ASH . L. R EV . 986, 1003 (2008); DAWN C. NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM: NET NEUTRALITY
AND FREE SPEECH IN THE INTERNET AGE 36 (2009).
249. NUNZIATO , supra note 248, at 2–3.
250. Tushnet, supra note 248, at 1010–11.
251. Id. at 1009.
252. Id.; N UNZIATO , supra note 248.
253. See Code of Conduct, INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS’ ASS’N J(31) (June 1, 2016) (S.
Afr.), https://ispa.org.za/code-of-conduct/; Act on the Limitation of Liability for Damages of Specified
Telecommunications Service Providers and the Right to Demand Disclosure of Identification Information of the Senders Act, Law No. 137 of 2001, art. 4, para. 2 (Japan), http://www.unesco.org/culture/pdf/anti-piracy/Japan/Jp_%20LimitLiability_Telecom_en; Act on Promotion of Information and
Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, Etc., Act No. 9119, June 13, 2008,
art. 44-6(1) (Claim to Furnish User’s Information) (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research
Institute
online
database,
http://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_mobile/viewer.do?hseq=38422&type=sogan&key=41.
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ethical version of the monitoring system that the ECtHR called for in Delfi v. Estonia.254 Rather, a notice-and-takedown regime whereby users submit requests to platforms for removal of harmful content would meet this standard. The practice that
would take platforms to a higher level of moral action beyond minimum legal requirements for removing content when notified would be for intermediaries to promote civil and constructive discourse on matters of public concern rather than
merely delete harmful speech.
For instance, if a Twitter user tweets something that is racist, and another user
flags the tweet for takedown, Twitter, if it chooses to remove the tweet, could respond to the user in the following manner:
We have decided to remove your tweet because several other users found
its content racist and offensive. Our goal at Twitter is to promote a civil
and constructive discourse among users. We value your contributions to
this discourse, and we encourage you to keep tweeting in a way that respects the values of our diverse community. If you believe the tweet was
removed in error, we invite you respond to the removal and let us know
why you believe your tweet was valuable to public discourse.
The next step in the process would be for intermediaries to act transparently
and pull back the curtain to reveal to users what the process of handling user requests for removal of content looks like. This approach could be based on several
elements that are steeped in an ethic of due process. Platforms should show users
the same guides that the employees rely on for taking down content.255 Indeed, Facebook took this step in April 2018 by releasing to the public the guidelines that
their content moderators use.256 Platforms should allow the user whose content was
removed to see, at the very least, how many times their content was flagged. Out of
concern for the safety for the individuals doing the flagging, it would be best to not
allow the user to see who flagged his or her content, lest he or she retaliates in some
way. However, knowing the number of flags would help the user get a sense of the
severity of his or her content.
Platforms should also allow users the option to appeal to get the posts reinstated. This model would be similar to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s provision that a user can formally appeal to have their allegedly copyright-infringing
content be reinstated under the theory that the takedown request was issued in bad
faith.257 This would give the user the opportunity to critically reflect on his or her
content to make the case that it should be a part of a social network’s public discourse. Facebook also instituted an appeals process for removed content in April

254. Delfi AS v. Estonia, App. No. 64569/09, 2015 Eur. Ct. H.R. 60–61, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-155105%22]}.
255. See, e.g., Adrian Chen, Inside Facebook’s Outsourced Anti-Porn and Gore Brigade, Where
‘Camel Toes’ are More Offensive Than ‘Crushed Heads’, G AWKER (Feb. 16, 2012, 3:45 PM),
http://gawker.com/5885714/inside-facebooks-outsourced-anti-porn-and-gore-brigade-where-cameltoes-are-more-offensive-than-crushed-heads (including an example of such a guide that an employee
leaked to the press).
256. Monika Bickert, Publishing Our Internal Enforcement Guidelines and Expanding Our Appeals
Process, F ACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Apr. 24, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/04/comprehensive-community-standards/.
257. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g) (2010).
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2018,258 though it has received criticism for its lack of transparency, which is ironic
given that the social network had simultaneously revealed its content moderation
guidelines to the public.259
Certainly, achieving a more complete ethic of transparency will take some time
and growing pains. However, scholars are starting to build more sophisticated ideas
of how to make content governance more transparent. For example, communication
scholar Tarleton Gillespie has suggested that Facebook and other platforms institute
a practice that he calls “collective flagging,” whereby data created by users reacting
to extreme content could be viewed in tandem with that content.260 Gillespie lays
the foundation for this idea in the notion that this data essentially belong to users,
because they would create the flags.261
It is worth noting that the legal regimes that establish a duty of care on intermediaries when they are notified of harmful content go no further in their definitions
of harm than Smolla’s three categories. Societal-level harms, such as those that are
potentially caused by fake news, are absent from these laws, although there is no
reason to believe laws could not be amended to force intermediaries into action on
such content. As of this writing, none of the laws analyzed here have been amended,
likely due to the relative recentness of the phenomenon and the lack of certainty as
to what degree (or even whether) it causes harm.262 In the meantime, intermediaries
could preempt legal action by setting up what I call a “notice-and-discussion” regime to handle UGC that is based on fake news. This regime is similar to the scenario discussed above in that it would be designed to encourage civil and constructive public discourse.
For instance, if Uncle John links to a fake news story while making a political
diatribe on Facebook, Cousin Jane, who knows the story is fake, could notify Facebook of the presence of the story as a means to prompt Facebook to post a comment
to Uncle John’s post with evidence demonstrating that the story is fake. The goal
here would not be to humiliate Uncle John, but rather to supply evidence from a
“neutral” third party that the story is fake. Furthermore, Facebook’s post could say
something like the following:
We appreciate your passion for this issue and your desire to start a conversation about it on Facebook. We encourage you to continue this discussion
with your friends armed with the appropriate facts about the issue.
Facebook could then supply Uncle John, and anyone else following the discussion, with links to a wide array of news sites that discuss an issue related to the issue
at the heart of the fake news story (e.g., an election). The goal of this approach
would be to stanch the flow of fake news, while not simultaneously cutting off the
258. Bickert, supra note 256.
259. Kate Klonick, Opinion, Facebook Released Its Content Moderation Rules. Now What?, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/26/opinion/facebook-content-moderationrules.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=opinion-c-colright-region&region=opinion-c-col-right-region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-right-region.
260. TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET: PLATFORMS, CONTENT MODERATION,
AND THE HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPE SOCIAL MEDIA 199 (2018).
261. Id.
262. Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election, 31 J.
ECON . P ERSP. 211, 232 (2017) (finding little evidence that fake news played a major role in determining
the results of the 2016 U.S. presidential election).
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discussion of important matters of public concern. In other words, the goal is more
speech based on facts.
It should be readily apparent that social media platforms want to embrace a
system of platform ethics, at the very least for prudential reasons. Professor Monroe
Price and researcher Stefaan Verhulst remind us that ethical principles can help digital intermediaries “evolve according to changing norms” in our global society.263
According to Price and Verhulst, ethical principles “neither mirror public opinion
nor necessarily lag or lead public opinion in terms of cultural norms”; rather, they
“represent a temporarily agreed upon set of standards which serves as a way-station
or modus vivendi as new modes of information are distributed.”264 The authors note
that “[g]reater flexibility can make it easier to respond to changes in technology
[and] modify expectations and outcomes,” which is especially important in the context of harmful third-party content, “which is culturally diverse and subject to
changing norms—is better suited to self-regulation.”265
Furthermore, Price and Verhulst argue that self-regulation via the adoption of
ethical standards affords intermediaries the “benefit of avoiding state intervention
in sensitive areas of basic rights.”266 Furthermore, a constant concern of digital intermediaries is that they might lose their “coolness” status among their users, leading users to turn their eyeballs elsewhere.267 The adage that a platform’s competition
“is just a click away” may be clichéd,268 but its truth lies in the once-popular social
networking platforms that have since been shuttered, such as MySpace, Friendster,
and Orkut. Following a set of precepts from platform ethics could help intermediaries at least maintain, or even enhance, their coolness as they seek to engage more
concertedly and transparently with their users and with their vital role in democracy.

V. CONCLUSION
This article examined intermediary liability laws in nine liberal democratic polities as they pertain to extreme UGC. The findings from this review were applied to
further build upon the concept of “platform ethics.”269 The debate over what duties
digital intermediaries have to their users is expanding and maturing.270 It must be
approached using metaethical theories as well as ethical norms distilled from comparative legal analysis. Platform ethics also must be conceptualized vis-à-vis the
various ways in which platforms affect our lives. Extreme speech is only part of the
story. Data privacy, advertising, and the facilitation of journalism are also important
263. MONROE E. P RICE AND S TEFAAN G. VERHULST , S ELF-R EGULATION AND THE I NTERNET 43
(2005).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 35.
266. Id. at 9.
267. Ally Marotti, Younger Users Flee their Parents’ Favorite Social Network, Facebook, at Surprising Pace, CHICAGO TRIB. (Feb. 12, 2018, 11:40 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-bizyounger-users-leaving-facebook-20180212-story.html.
268. See Steve Lohr, Onetime Allies in Antitrust Part Ways over Google, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/17/technology/onetime-allies-in-antitrust-part-ways-overgoogle.html (attributing this phrase to Google, which “repeatedly says, competition is “‘just a click
away.’”).
269. Speech, Harm and the Duties of Digital Intermediaries, supra note 5.
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lenses from which to view platform ethics. Scholars should continue the conversation in these areas through scholarship that involves legal research as well as ethical
research, empirical studies as well as normative ones, and adopting domestic approaches to study as well as comparative.
As a final note, the discussion on whether the exceptional § 230 should be revised is also still ongoing. This article does not expressly advocate for a position in
that debate, except to say any amendments that do materialize should not be put
forth as a kneejerk reaction to the harms social media platforms facilitate against
both individuals and society. Rather, they should be considered with a full understanding of the nature of the harms being facilitated and a high degree of certainty
that amendments would in fact curb these harms. If platforms have not developed a
set of sound ethical principles (not unlike those discussed here) to ameliorate these
harms on their own, then United States lawmakers would be justified in amending
§ 230 to do so.
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